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8.1  Introduction 
Convergence of  per capita or per household income among states or 
regions in the postwar period is well known (see U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1978, 1981; Hanna 1957). Income growth rates in the South 
and the Southwest-the  Sun Belt-have  exceeded those in the older and 
richer northern and New England states-the  Snow Belt. Traditionally 
northern industries such as textiles and furniture have migrated to the 
southern states while new technology industries have concentrated their 
growth in the South and the Southwest. 
This narrowing of regional inequality has occurred simultaneously with 
two other postwar phenomena-an  exceptionally rapid increase in public 
income transfers and the essential stability of the degree of inequality in 
the overall distribution of  post-transfer income (see Danziger, Haveman, 
and Plotnick  1981). In this paper, we will explore the anatomy of  the 
regional convergence of  incomes and relate this convergence to the high 
and stubborn level of  overall income inequality.  In addition, we will 
explore the pattern of  within-region inequality among the regions. The 
primary questions we will ask and attempt to answer are: 
1. What role have income transfers played in the observed reduction 
of  income inequality among regions of  the country? 
2.  Which regions display the greatest income inequality, and for which 
regions has the inequality within the region changed the most over time? 
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3. To what extent have income transfers offset the high and growing 
inequality in the distribution of  market income within regions? 
4.  In which regions have income transfers been used most effectively 
in reducing market income inequality? 
5. What factors determine the impact of transfers in reducing inequal- 
ity within states and regions? 
The focus of  this paper is on individual regions and differences among 
them. This focus deserves comment. What is there about regional group- 
ings of people that makes them a relevant unit of analysis? While analyses 
of  differences  in  average incomes or income inequality  among racial 
groups or age groups are common fare and require little defense, studies 
of  regional differences in average income or inequality are often viewed 
as suspect and artificial. What makes such studies worthwhile?' 
To be sure, individual members of  racial or age groupings are inexo- 
rably identified with their group; membership in these clubs is not volun- 
tary.  Such is not  the case with  regions.  Those not pleased  with  the 
opportunities implied by the average incomes or the income inequality in 
their current location are, in principle at least, free to choose another. 
While migration costs do  exist and provide some rationale for focusing on 
regional groupings, immobility cannot be relied on as the sole basis for 
regional analysis; nor can the proposition that individuals view others in 
their region as a more accurate comparison group than members of  their 
race or age cohort. 
Our defense for analyzing income and inequality differences among 
regions, and the impact of  income transfers on these differences, is a 
straightforward one. For whatever reason, people are interested in differ- 
ences in regional performance; in whether the South is poorer or growing 
more rapidly than the North. Perhaps this reflects a view that a viable 
federalism requires that the variance in economic performance among 
regions be minimized. Perhaps it only reflects interest in the outcome of 
the competitive process that exists among states or regions in a federal 
system. 
While this interest in regional performance exists generally among the 
population, it  is  apparently  magnified  among national  policymakers. 
Legislative measures are typically designed with regional equity as an 
explicit  objective,  and congressional requests for analysis of  regional 
impact are common. Indeed, in many legislative measures, considera- 
tions of regional performance form the primary bases for the allocation of 
funds. Revenue sharing is an important example. And in those measures 
the indicators of  regional performance used are precisely those of  this 
study: differences in average income among regions, differences in re- 
gional income growth, and differences in inequality among regions (as 
indicated by regional unemployment rates or regional rates of poverty 
incidence). Our regionally based measurements and estimates are de- 
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8.2  Income Transfers and Their Growth, 1965-81 
Public spending on income transfers is large and has grown rapidly in 
recent years as new programs have been enacted, benefit levels in existing 
programs have been increased, and eligibility requirements have been 
loosened. In 1981  expenditures on these programs are estimated to reach 
almost $300 billion, an amount that is about  10 percent of  the Gross 
National Product. 
Table 8.1 lists the major income transfer programs and shows their 
expenditures for 1965 and 1979 and estimates for 1981. These programs 
are divided into two types: social insurance and public assistance. Within 
Table 8.1  Expenditures on Major Income Transfer Programs 
Public Expenditures 
(billions of  current dollars) 
Date  1981 
Enacted  1965  1979  (estimate) 
Social insurance 
Cash benefits: 
Social Security (OASDI) 
Unemployment insurance 
Workers’ compensation 





Public assistance (welfare) 
Cash benefits: 
Aid to Families with Dependent 









Total expenditures as a percentage of  GNP 
1935  $16.5  $102.6  $137.0 
1935  2.5  11.2  18.7 
1908  1.8  9.9  14.8 
1917  2.2  6.8  7.5 
1937  1.1  4.3  5.2 
1969  NE  0.6  0.9 
1965  NE  29.1  38.4 
1935  1.7  10.8  12.8 
1972  2.7  6.8  8.5 
1933  1.9  3.6  4.1 
NA  0.4  1.2  1.5 
1965  0.5  21.8  27.6 
1964  0.04  6.8  9.7 
1937  0.3  4.4  6.6 
$31.6  $219.9  $293.3 
4.6  9.1  10.0 
SOURCES:  The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year, 1981, and its appendix 
for 1979 and 1981 estimates. Plotnick and Skidmore (1975) for 1965 data. Social insurance 
programs condition benefits on contributions based on previous employment; public assist- 
ance programs condition benefits on current income and assets (means-tested). 
NA  = not applicable, varies by states. 
NE  = nonexistent. 
‘Aid  to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Old Age Assistance 
in 1965. 
bMedical Aid to the Aged in 1965. 286  David Betson/Robert Haveman 
each category are programs providing cash income and others providing 
in-kind benefits. 
The programs have two basic objectives-replacing  income losses from 
events that are largely outside an individual’s control, and assuring a 
minimum level of  economic support to those who have little other in- 
come. The first objective is largely served by social insurance programs 
for which eligibility and benefit levels depend on past contributions and 
some identifiable problem, such as old age, death of  spouse, illness, 
disability, or unemployment. One does not have to prove financial need 
to claim benefits. Social insurance accounts for nearly three-quarters of 
the expenditures. 
The second objective is served by the public assistance (welfare) pro- 
grams for which inadequate economic means is the chief eligibility crite- 
rion. Receipt of welfare benefits is not conditioned on past contributions. 
Benefits are asset- and income-tested-they  vary inversely with income 
from private sources and social insurance. 
These income transfer programs have grown rapidly in recent years 
with expenditures increasing from 4.6 percent of  GNP in 1965 to 10.0 
percent in 1981. Table 8.2 shows the increase in both the number of 
beneficiaries of  the cash transfer programs and the size of  the average 
benefit and compares this growth with that of  census money income. In 
1965, 37 percent of  all households received a cash transfer; by  1978, 42 
percent were recipients. The last column shows that the average transfer 
for recipient households increased by 55.3 percent, while census money 
income increased by only 20 percent. 
Given the targeting of income transfers on those experiencing income 
losses and those without adequate economic means, the growth in these 
expenditures would be expected to have narrowed income differences in 
a wide variety of dimensions. In this paper we will focus on two-income 
differences within regions (states) and income differences among regions 
(states). 
8.3  Cash Transfers and Inter- and Intrastate Income 
Differentials-A  Static View 
Although the convergence of  average state incomes has been well 
documented, substantial differences in average household incomes still 
exist among states. Table 8.3 presents the mean household income by 
four different income concepts in 1975 for the fifty states and the District 
of  Columbia. The four income concepts are: 
Y,  = Cash income from wages, salaries, rents, dividends, interests, and 
Y2  = Y,  plus social insurance income. 
Y3  = Y2  plus welfare income (i.e., “post-transfer income”). 
Y4 = Y3 minus taxes paid (i.e., “post-tax, post-transfer income”).’ 
miscellaneous sources (i.e., “market income”). Table 8.2  Cash Income Transfers and Census Money Income of Households" in Constant 1978 Dollars, 1965 and 1978 
1965  1978  1965-78 
Mean for  Percent of  Mean for  Percent of  Real 
Recipient  Households  Recipient  Households  Growth of 
Households  Receiving  Households  Receiving  Mean 
Social Security and 
Public assistanceb  2006  5  2079  8  3.6 
Other cash government 
transfers'  1801  18  2973  17  65.1 
One or more cash transfersd  2532  37  3931  42  55.3 
Total census money income  13767  -  16518  -  20.0 
Cash transfers as a percentage 
railroad retirement  $ 2407  22%  $  3747  26%  55.7% 
-  -  of  money income  6.8%  -  10.0% 
SOURCE:  Computations by authors from 1966 Survey of  Economic Opportunity and March 1979 Current Population Survey. 
"Households include families and unrelated individuals. The programs represented here differ  from those in table 8.1. The Census does not gather data on 
in-kind transfers, nor does it disaggregate cash transfers by program to the extent shown in table 8.1. 
bIncludes  Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income (Old Age Assistance, Aid to  the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and 
Totally Disabled in 1965), and General Assistance. 
'Includes  unemployment compensation,  workers' compensation, government employee pensions, and veterans'  pensions and compensation. 
dThe  mean value in this row exceeds the mean for any individual category, and the percentage receiving one or more transfer is lower than the sum of rows 
1-3,  because some households receive more than one transfer. 288  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
Table 8.3  Mean State Household Income-1975 
Number of 
Households 
Mean Income of  State 






















20  NB 
21  KS 
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22  DE 
23 MD 
24  DC 
25  VA 
26  WV 
27  NC 
28  SC 
29  GA 
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35  AR 
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Table 8.3 (continued) 
Number of 
Households 
(in 1000)  Yl  Y2  y3  y4 
Mean Income of  State 
West 
39  MT 
40  ID 




45  UT 
46  NV 
47  WA 
48  OR 
49  CA 
50  AK 













































































The data in table 8.3 contain a number of  patterns. First, for market 
income (  Yl),  the gap between the highest and lowest state is substantial- 
$9848 (Mississippi) to $23,407 (Alaska). The ratio of  the highest to the 
lowest is 2.4. For census income (  Y3),  the gap is smaller-$11,279  (Missis- 
sippi) to $24,234 (Alaska)-and  the ratio of the highest to the lowest falls 
to 2.1.  Because of  income transfers, the ratio is reduced by  about 15 
percent. When taxes are accounted for as well, the gap again narrows- 
from $9327 (Mississippi) to $17,065 (Alaska)-and  the ratio of the high- 
est to the lowest falls to 1.8. At a point in time, the tax-transfer system 
makes an important contribution to narrowing the regional disparity in 
average household incomes. 
The above numbers document the substantial regional disparities in 
average incomes that still exist. Related questions concern the extent to 
which these disparities contribute to total inequality in the nation, and 
the role of the tax-transfer system in reducing these regional differentials. 
One measure of  inequality that can be decomposed into a measure of 
inequality  among states and inequality within the states is the Theil 
measure of  inconie inequality (see appendix B for a description of  the 
Theil index and its decomposition).  Indeed, the Theil index of  total 
inequality among households in the nation (TT) has two components- 
the level of Theil inequality in per household income among regions (TA) 
and the average level of Theil inequality in per household income within 
regions (Tw). Thus, 
(1)  TT=TA+Tw. 290  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
Table 8.4  Theil Indices of Inequality for the Four Income Concepts, 1975 
y,  y2  y3  y4 
TW  ,974  .531  .291  .220 
T*  .006  ,005  ,004  .003 
TT  ,979  .536  ,296  ,223 
For 1975 the total level of household income inequality (TT)  and its two 
components (TA  and Tw) are shown in table 8.4 for the four income 
concepts. Several patterns are clear in this table: 
1. The major component of  total inequality among households (TT) 
for all of  the income concepts is inequality among households within 
states (Tw) rather than inequality in mean household income among the 
states (TA). For Yl,  TA  accounts for only about .7  percent of TT;  for Y4,  TA 
accounts for about 1.3  percent of TT. If  all differences in average incomes 
among states were eliminated while the level of inequality among house- 
holds within states was left untouched, total inequality among households 
in the nation would decrease by less than 2 percent. 
2.  At a point in time, 1975, transfers cause a decrease in TA  inequal- 
ity-from  .006 to .004, a decrease of  23 percent. Transfers have a sub- 
stantially larger effect on T-a  decrease from .97 to .29, or 70 percent. 
For TT, total income inequality, transfers  effected a reduction  of  69 
percent. The tax-transfer system accounted for a reduction of 77 percent 
in Tw, 48 percent in TA,  and 77 percent in TT. 
Analogous to the question of  inequality in the average income per 
household among the states is the question of  the extent to which the 
states are similar to each other in terms of the level of income inequality 
within each state. Table 8.5 presents the pattern of  inequality within 
states for all of the states. The four income concepts used in measuring 
this gap between the rich and poor within states are the Yl,  Y,,  Y,,  and Y4 
concepts, and the Theil index within states is the indicator of inequality. 
As with mean household income differences, states also differ substan- 
tially in terms of  within state inequality. States in the South generally 
have the most substantial inequality, with the Northcentral region dis- 
playing the smallest gap between rich and poor. For market incomes (  Yl), 
the ratio of the most unequal distribution of income (Mississippi) to the 
least  unequal  (Wisconsin) is  2.2.  For post-transfer  income (Y3),  the 
disparity among states in terms of within-state inequality falls substan- 
tially, and the ratio of the most unequal to the least unequal decreases to 
1.3. When taxes are accounted for, all states have even less within-state 
inequality. However, the ratio of the most unequal to the least unequal 
rises slightly to 1.4. Overall one can conclude that the tax-transfer system 
not only dramatically reduces the overall level of inequality within states, 
but also reduces the dispersion in within-state inequality. That is, the 291  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
Table 8.5  Theil Indices of Income Inequality Within States-1975 
Northeast 
1  ME 
2  NH 
3vT 
4  MA 




9  PA 
Northcentral 
10  OH 









20  NB 
21  KS 
South 
22  DE 
23 MD 
24  DC 
25  VA 
26  WV 
27  NC 
28  SC 
29  GA 
30  FL 
31 KY 
32  TN 
33 AL 
34  MS 
35  AR 
36  LA 
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Table 8.5 (continued) 
y,  y2  y2  y4 
West  .876  .575  .297  .216 
39 m 
40  ID 
41  WY 
42  CO 
43 NM 
44  AZ 
45  UT 
46  NV 
47  WA 
48  OR 
49  CA 






















































SOURCE:  Calculations by authors from 1976 Survey of  Income and Education. 
tax-transfer system not only reduces the Theil index within all states, but 
it also tends to make states more similar in their levels of inequality? 
We have discussed how the tax-transfer system has affected the differ- 
ences among states in two separate dimensions: average state income and 
the degree of within-state inequality. To bring together these two dimen- 
sions of  regional  inequality  at  a point  in  time, we  have  defined an 
indicator of the differences among states, which is the sum of the relative 
variation in these two dimensions. This indicator is based on the relative 
variance among states in each of the two dimensions. This summary index 
of  income and inequality differences across states, RV,,  can be used to 
describe the overall role of  transfers in the convergence of  states-the 
convergence in average incomes among states (RVp) and the conver- 
gence of  within-state inequality (RV,,)!  In table 8.6, we present RV, 
along with its components for the four income concepts as computed 
from the 1975 Survey of  Income and Education (SIE). 
Table 8.6  Measures of Differences Among States, 1975 
Income 
Concept  RV,  RVIN  RV, 
Yl  .012  .031  ,042 
y2  ,010  ,027  .037 
y3  ,009  .004  ,013 
y4  ,007  .005  .011 
SOURCE:  Computed by authors from the Survey of  Income and Education, 1975. 293  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
Several interesting patterns emerge from the measures of  the differ- 
ences among states shown in table 8.6.  First, when market income (Yl) is 
used as the basis of comparison, the relative dissimilarity among states is 
caused  primarily  by  differences in  within-state inequality.  But when 
transfers are accounted for (Y3), the index of  overall differences among 
states falls by  68 percent, primarily because of  a dramatic fall in the 
component of  the index attributable to inequality within states (RVIN). 
Further, when Y,  is the income concept used as the basis of comparison, 
relative dissimilarity in within-state inequality (RVIN) is reduced to one- 
half the magnitude of  RVf.  When income before transfers (Y,)  is the 
income concept used, RV,,  is three times RVf. Second, after adding in 
the effect of taxes (Y4),  we see that states become even more similar, but 
the effect is not as dramatic as the effect of  transfers. In summary, the 
measures of differences among states presented in table 8.6 suggest that 
the tax-transfer system does have a dramatic effect in reducing differ- 
ences among states. This effect is primarily the result of the reduction of 
the dissimilarity among states in within-state income inequality. 
These statistics, then, suggest a major role of  income transfers and 
taxes in decreasing observed income inequality at a psint in time. For 
1975, the tax-transfer system reduced inequality in all the dimensions on 
which we  are focusing: (1) among households in the nation  (TT), (2) 
among households within states (T,),  and (3) among states (TA). Income 
transfers have decreased income inequality within states relatively more 
than they have decreased the inequality in average household income 
among the states. RVIN falls from .031 to .004 in moving from Yl  to Y,-a 
decrease of  87 percent.  RVf,  however,  drops from  .012 to .009, a 
decrease of  19 percent. Transfers have caused states to be more alike in 
terms of  the rich-poor disparity within states (RVIN) than in terms of 
mean income differences among them. This suggests that the often noted 
convergence  in regional  incomes is caused  in  part  by  the growth in 
transfers, but that other factors have also played an important role. To 
answer this question more completely, changes in TT  inequality over time 
need to be decomposed. 
8.4  Income Transfers and Intra- and Interstate 
Income Differences-A  View across Time 
Growing income transfers can affect inequality over time in a variety of 
ways. In this section we will try to identify the impact of  the transfer 
system on a number of inequality measures over time. In particular, to 
what extent have transfers contributed to changes in: 
1. inequality in household incomes within states (T,)  over time? 
2.  inequality in mean household income among states (TA) over time? 
3. inequality in household incomes within the nation (TT) over time? 
4.  inequality in the rich-poor gap among states (RVIN) over time? 294  David Betson/Robert Haveman 
Table 8.7  Theil Indices of Inequality within Regions (T,,,), Inequality among 
Regions, (TA),  and Total Inequality (TT) for Y, and Y3, 1967-79 
~~ 
K  y3 
Year  TW  TA  TT  TW  TA  TT 
1967  ,959  .008  .967  ,348  .007  .355 
1968  ,916  ,007  .924  .333  ,006  ,339 
1969  ,910  .007  ,917  ,336  ,006  ,342 
1970  .996  ,006  1.002  .350  ,006  .356 
1971  1.034  .006  1.040  ,348  .005  ,353 
1972  1.052  .006  1.058  .349  ,005  .354 
1973  1.063  ,005  1.069  .338  .004  .342 
1974  1.100  .005  1.105  .337  .004  ,341 
1975  1.099  ,005  1.104  .333  ,004  .337 
1976  1.099  .006  1.105  .332  .005  ,336 
1977  1.099  .005  1.104  ,332  .004  ,336 
1978  1.049  .004  1.053  .335  ,003  ,339 
1979  1.017  ,004  1.022  .341  ,003  ,344 
SOURCE:  Calculations by authors from 1968-80  Current Population Surveys. 
Table 8.7 presents Theil indexes for the years 1967-79  based on micro- 
data from the Current Population Surveys for 1968-80,  with states aggre- 
gated to twenty regions. The indices for Yl  and Y3  are shown. Several 
patterns are of  interest: 
1. Total inequality in market income (TTfor Yl)  increased from 1967 to 
1979 from .967 to 1.022. Its pattern was somewhat irregular-declining 
during the 1960s, increasing steadily until the mid-1970s, and falling in 
1978 and 1979. 
2.  Total inequality in census money income (TT for Y3)  was nearly 
constant at about .35, although a smaller negative trend can be observed, 
at least until 1977. Hence, the increasing inequality in market income is 
not  observed  for post-transfer  income. Transfers contributed to this 
difference. 
3.  Inequality in market income among households within regions (T, 
for Yl)  increased markedly from .959 to 1.017 from 1967 to 1979. The 
distribution of  census money income within regions (T,  for Y,) stayed 
approximately constant at about .34, again implying a strong offsetting 
role for income transfers. 
4.  Inequality in average household income among regions (TA) de- 
creased substantially from 1967 to 1979, irrespective of the income con- 
cept chosen. For market income (Yl),  a measure largely unaffected by 
transfers, the decrease was from .0080 to .0044, a decrease of 46 percent. 
For post-transfer income (Y,), the decrease was from .0070 to .0035-a 
50 percent reduction. Transfers have contributed little if  anything to the 
convergence among states over time in average incomes. 295  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
The role of transfers in decreasing aggregate income inequality among 
households at a point in time (TT)  has increased over time. This is shown 
in table 8.8 in both absolute (column 1) and relative (column 2) terms. In 
absolute terms,  income  transfers  reduced  the  aggregate  Theil  index 
among households in the nation (TT)  by about .6 points in the late 1960s. 
By the late 1970s,  this impact had grown to about .7 points. In percentage 
terms, transfers reduced pretransfer inequality by about 63 percent in the 
late 1960s; by the late 1970s, this had increased to about 68 percent. The 
reason for this increased impact of transfers is shown in columns 3 and 4 
of table 8.8. The percent of households receiving transfers increased from 
34 to  43 percent from 1967 to 1979. During the same period, transfers as a 
percent of  total census income rose from 6.2 to 8 percent. 
The contribution of transfers to the reduction in overall regional differ- 
ences is shown in table 8.9. The impact indicators shown are for (1) the 
absolute and percentage impact of  transfers on the relative variance of 
average household income among regions (RVp), (2) the absolute and 
percentage impact on the relative variance of  within-region inequality 
among regions (RVIN),  and (3) the summary indicator of  income and 
inequality differences among regions (RV,).  In column 4, transfers are 
seen to have reduced the relative variance of mean incomes among states 
by between 9 and 20 percent. This effect has been growing over time. In 
column 5,  the impact of transfers on the reduction of the relative variance 
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SOURCE:  Calculations by  authors from the 1968-80  Current Population Surveys. 296  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
Table 8.9  Overall Differences among States and the Percentage Impact of 
Transfers on These Differences, 1967-79 
Percentage Reduction 
Attributable to Transfers 
Differences  in Differences 
among States in Y, 




























































































SOURCE:  Calculations by authors from the 1968 and 1980 Current Population Surveys. 
of  within-state inequality ranges from 48 to 78 percent and has been 
growing rapidly since 1967. The last column of table 8.9 shows the effect 
of transfers on overall convergence among states. The effect of transfers 
on this indicator is also growing over time, rising from 33 percent in 1967 
to 61 percent in 1979. 
From these comparisons, the following propositions would seem to 
hold. First, the convergence in average household market income among 
regions from 1967 to 1979 (indicated in table 8.7 by the decrease in TA,y, 
or  by the change in RVp in table 8.9) dampened the impact of the marked 
increase in within-region market income inequality during this period 
(indicated in table 8.7 by the increase in Tw,y,)  on the level of  overall 
inequality. Second, the substantial decrease in observed inequality in 
average income among regions from 1967 to 1979 (as indicated by the 
decrease in TA,*,  in table 8.7) is primarily the result of  a decrease in 
market income inequality. This is indicated by the change in TA,y,  from 
.008 to .004 over the 1967-79  period-with  little if  any increase in the 
absolute impact of transfers on inequality among regions. While transfers 
decreased inequality in average household income among regions by .001 
in 1967 (a 13 percent reduction), they accounted for a .0009 decrease in 
inequality between regions in 1979 (a 20 percent reduction). Third, the 
role of  transfers in the overall convergence of  states (as measured by 
decreases in RV,  over time) has been primarily through reducing the 297  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
disparity  among states in the level of  within-state inequality (i.e., in 
reducing RV,,). 
8.5  Patterns of Intraregional Inequality 
and the Impact of Transfers 
In this section, we look more carefully at the patterns of intraregional 
inequality at a point in time, and changes in this pattern across time. In 
particular, we attempt to assess the impact of  the level, growth, and 
distribution of  transfers on intraregional inequality, both at a point in 
time and over time. 
8.5.1 
The first three columns of table 8.10 show the pattern of regional growth 
in market income (Yl)  and income transfers over the period of  1967 to 
1979. In the first column of table 8.10, the growth in real average house- 
hold income (Yl)  is shown for the various regions. For the nation as a 
whole, average real market income grew 9.1 percent over the thirteen- 
year  period.  This overall  average conceals substantial  differences in 
regional growth rates. These extend from a negative 2.7 percent growth 
(New York) to growth of  20.8 percent in Alabama and Mississippi. 
The second column in table 8.10 shows the real growth in transfer 
income per household from 1967 to 1979, by region and for the nation as a 
whole. While the percentage increase for the nation is 43 percent, it 
varies by  region from  -32  percent (Washington, D.C.) to 71 percent 
(Pennsylvania). The highest rates of increase occurred in the Northeast- 
ern states (58.7 percent); the Western states have had the lowest transfer 
growth rates (38.1 percent). The third column in table 8.10 shows the 
percentage change in the ratio of income transfers to market income (Yl) 
for each of the regions from 1967 to 1979. For the United States, transfers 
as a percent of  pretransfer income increased from 6.7 percent to 8.7 
percent,  a  31  percent  increase.  For  individual  regions  (excluding 
Washington,  D.C.), the change in the ratio of  transfer  income to Yl 
ranges from 7 percent to 67 percent. 
Inspection of the table shows that the increase in transfers as a percent 
of  income was greater over the period for states in the higher-income 
Northeast region than it was for the other regions, especially the South 
and West. This pattern reflects the more rapid growth in the market 
income denominator  of  the southern and western  states than  in  the 
Northeast, as well as the somewhat slower growth of income transfers in 
the South. In short, the rapid increase in market incomes in the southern 
and western states (which account for over 90 percent of  total income) 
Regional Growth in Market Incomes and 
Transfers, 1967-79 Table 8.10  Regional Growth in Incomes, Transfers, and Their Impact on Inequality: 1967-79 
Percentage Change in:  Transfer 
Impact 
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from 1967 to 1979 overwhelms the impact of transfer income which grew 
somewhat more rapidly in the North than in other regions. 
8.5.2  The Patterns of  Change in Intraregional Inequality, 1967-79 
In the fourth and fifth columns of table 8.10, we show an index of the 
change in within-region inequality in both Yl and Y3  from 1967 to 1979  for 
each of the twenty regions and for the United States. The index shown is 
the percentage change in Tw from 1967 to 1979 for both Y, and Y3. 
Several patterns are evident. Consider first the change in the pattern of 
within-region inequality in market income (  Yl).  In fourteen of the twenty 
regions, market incomes became more unequal (as measured by Tw,y,) 
from 1967 to 1979. The percentage increase in inequality was the greatest 
for New York (+  25 percent) and Pennsylvania (+  21 percent). Florida 
and Iowa et al. displayed the greatest reduction in pretransfer inequality, 
with percentage changes of  -18  and -15,  respectively. Among census 
regions, the increase in Y, inequality within regions was the greatest for 
the Northeast (increasing 16.1 percent); the West recorded the smallest 
increase (1.1 percent). 
For post-transfer income (  Y3),  the pattern is quite different-eleven of 
the regions showed a reduction in inequality from  1967 to 1979. The 
greatest percentage reductions in post-transfer income inequality were 
experienced by Delaware et al. ( -14  percent) and Alabama-Mississippi 
(  -12  percent); the greatest percentage increases in post-transfer income 
inequality were recorded for Arizona et al. (+  8 percent) and Pennsylva- 
nia  (+7 percent). All of  the southern regions recorded  decreases in 
post-transfer inequality,  except the District of  Columbia and Texas. 
While the South showed a reduction in post-transfer inequality within the 
region of 7.5 percent, both the West and the Northeast had only slight 
reductions in post-transfer inequality. 
8.5.3  The Contribution of  Transfers to the 
Reduction of  Within-Region Inequality Over Time 
The patterns in table 8.10 suggest that in nearly all regions transfer 
income has worked to offset generally increasing inequality in the dis- 
tribution of  market income (Y,).  In some regions (e.g., Ohio, Illinois, 
North  Carolina et al.), inequality in post-transfer  income (Tw,y,) de- 
creased from 1967 to 1979 in spite of  an increase in pretransfer income 
inequality  (Tw,y,); in  other regions, census income inequality has in- 
creased from 1967 to 1979 in spite of  increased transfers. And, in a few 
regions, post-transfer inequality increased from 1967 to 1979 by  more 
than pretransfer inequality, suggesting that the growth in transfers did 
not contribute to a decrease in inequality. 
The last column in table 8.10 is an attempt to indicate the role of 
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(Tw,y,) over time. The  index of the role of transfers used in the table is the 
difference between the percentage impact on inequality of  transfers in 
1967 and that recorded for 1979, that is, 
For example, if for some region transfers reduced inequality between Yl 
and Y,  by 40 percent in 1979, but only reduced it by 29 percent in 1967, a 
score of  11 would be recorded for this index. 
Again, several patterns can be observed. First, in six of  the twenty 
regions the index has a negative sign, indicating that transfers played a 
less strong equalizing role in these regions in 1979 than in 1967. Three 
options are possible here: (1) inequality in Y3  increased by more than Yl 
inequality  from  1967 to 1979, (2)  inequality in  Y3 fell by  less'than 
Yl inequality from 1967 to 1979, and (3) inequality in Y3  increased while 
Yl inequality decreased. All three options are represented in the six 
regions with negative indices. However, for fourteen of  the twenty re- 
gions transfers played a more equalizing role in 1979 than in 1967. 
Second, the reduction in inequality of  post-transfer income beyond 
what would be expected if  post-transfer inequality changed at the same 
pace as pretransfer inequality is greatest in New York, New Jersey, North 
Carolina et al., and Kentucky-Tennessee. Third, for the United States as 
a whole, transfers played a stronger role in decreasing within region 
inequality  in  1979 than  in  1967. The weighted average reduction  in 
within-region inequality in post-transfer income from 1967 to 1979 is 8 
percentage points greater than the weighted average change in within- 
region pretransfer inequality.  Finally, transfers played a substantially 
greater role in reducing within-region inequality over time in the North- 
east and the South than in the West and Northcentral regions. 
These results document the increases in inequality in market income 
within regions from 1967 to 1979, and indicate the major role income 
transfers have played in mitigating that increase. A related question is: 
Have regions become more or less alike over time in the extent of  the 
rich-poor  gap within the region? Is there convergence or divergence 
among the regions in within-region inequality over time? 
8.5.4  The Convergence in Intraregional Inequality, 1967-79, 
and the Role of  Transfers 
In table 8.11, the within-region inequality of each of the twenty regions 
is shown for each of the income concepts (Yl,  Y2,  Y3),  for 1967 and 1979. 
The Theil index (Tw) is the measure of  the rich-poor gap within each 
region,  and  each  regional  Theil  index is stated  as  a fraction  of  the 
weighted average within-region Theil for the United States. For 1967, the 
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(Michigan-Wisconsin). The difference is .61. For Y3,  the highest 1967 
ratio is 1.32 (Alabama-Mississippi); the lowest is -79 (Indiana). This is a 
difference of  .53, substantially smaller than the high-low difference for 
Y,. The reduction in the range from .61 to .53 is attributable to income 
transfers. 
The same pattern is observed for 1979. The highest ratio for Y,  in 1979 
is 1.43 (Alabama-Mississippi); the lowest is .74 (Washington et al.), for a 
difference of  .69. This increase in the difference among regions in within- 
region inequality in Y, from 1967 to 1979 is consistent with earlier data 
indicating the increasing inequality in market incomes generally. The 
highest ratio for Y3  in 1979 is 1.22 (D.C.); the lowest is .91 (Maine et al.), 
for a difference of  .31. This decrease in the range from .69 to .31 is 
attributable to income transfers in 1979. 
From these crude comparisons, it appears that: 
1. There has been divergence in within-region inequality in pretrans- 
fer income from 1967 to 1979. The range in the within inequality ratio 
increased from .61 to .69 from 1967 to 1979. 
2.  There has been  substantial convergence in  the rich-poor gap in 
post-transfer income among regions from 1967 to 1979. The range in the 
within inequality ratio decreased from .53 to .31 from 1967 to 1979. 
3.  The switch from divergence to convergence in within-region in- 
equality is attributable to the growth of  transfers from 1967 to 1979. 
4. In 1967 transfers  reduced  the range  of  within-region inequality 
among regions from .61 (Yl)  to .53 (Y3),  a 13 percent decrease. In 1979 
transfers reduced the range of inequality among regions from .69 (Yl)  to 
.31 (Y3),  a 55 percent decrease. 
The extent of convergence in the regional rich-poor gap (as measured 
by the Theil inequality index) among the regions, and the role of transfers 
in this convergence, is also shown in table 8.12. Comparing Yl and Y3,  the 
same patterns are observed as described above for the range. Namely: 
1. The regions diverged over time in terms of inequality in pretransfer 
income. The measure of variation among the regions increased from ,021 
to .025, an increase of  22 percent. 
2.  The regions converged over time in terms of  inequality in post- 
transfer income. The measure of variation among the regions decreased 
from .011 to .007, a decrease of  39 percent. 
Table 8.12  Index of the Relative Variance in the Extent of Within-Region 
Inequality (RV,,),  1967 and 1979 
1967  ,021  ,026  ,011 
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3. The swing from a 22 percent increase in disparity among the states in 
within-region inequality (for Y,) to a 39 percent decrease in disparity 
among the regions in within-region inequality (for Y3)  is attributable to 
the growth in income transfers and their improved targeting on low- 
income households. 
4.  In 1967, transfers accounted for the reduction from .021 to .011 in 
disparity among the regions in the rich-poor gap from Y, to Y3.  This is a 
reduction of  48 percent. In 1979, transfers reduced the among-region 
disparity from  .025 (YJ to .007 (Y3),  a reduction of  74 percent. The 
impact of  transfers in reducing the disparity among the regions in the 
variation in the regional rich-poor gap in 1979 is more than 150 percent of 
the 1967 impact of  transfers. 
An important and puzzling pattern is observed in table 8.12. Within 
each of the years, the disparity in within-region inequality recorded for Y2 
is about the same as that for Y,.  Social insurance transfers, it appears, do 
not serve to reduce the disparity among states in the extent of  within- 
region inequality. This pattern can also be observed in table 8.11 where, 
in 1967,  fifteen of the twenty regions are shifted away from a ratio of unity 
in moving from Y, to Y2;  for 1979, eleven of  the twenty regions are so 
shifted. This pattern remains unexplained. 
8.6  The Determinants of the Impact of Transfers in Reducing 
Within-Region Inequality-A  Preliminary Examination 
This evidence, then, suggests that transfers have resulted in a decrease 
in the dispersion of incomes within states, and that this contribution to 
reduced within-state income differences has increased over time.  For 
nearly  all states at any point  in time, the distribution  of  pretransfer 
income (Yl)  is more unequal than the distribution of post-transfer income 
(Y3).  The contribution  of  transfers  to this  reduction  in inequality- 
measured as (Tw,yl - Tw,y3)-varies  substantially across states, how- 
ever. For example, in 1975, this indicator ranged from .22 to 1.20. The 
question is:  What determines the impact of  transfers in reducing the 
inequality of  income within states at a point of  time? 
Here we adopt two approaches in describing the role of  transfers in 
decreasing within-state inequality. As appendix B shows, decomposing 
the change in Theil inequality from Yl to Y3  suggests that the impact of 
transfers on within-state inequality depends largely on q  (the percentage 
of  the households within a state that are transfer recipients) and 6 (the 
proportion of the total income of recipients accounted for by transfers). 
Our first approach focuses on this decomposition and measures the effect 
of  both  -q  and 6 on the reduction  of  within-state inequality (Tw,y,  - 
T,,,,),  which we will designate as I. In this formulation, then, 
(2)  Z=S~+S1~+8~6+~1. 306  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
However, neither q nor 8 are, themselves, exogenous variables. For 
example, the percentage of households that are recipients (q) depends on 
the demographic characteristics of the state. Ceteris paribus, states with 
more older or retired households, for example, would expect to have a 
larger proportion of  households receiving transfers-a  larger q  . Simi- 
larly, states with larger family sizes would, ceteris paribus, have a larger 
ratio of transfer to total income for those receiving transfers-a  larger 8. 
A more appropriate  statement of  the determinants of  the impact of 




q = a’Z +  €2, 
8 = p’z +  €3, 
I = so  + s1  + s2  8 +  El  , 
where Z  is a vector of  exogenous determinants of  q and 8, chosen to 
reflect the characteristics of  states likely to influence the number of 
transfer  recipients in the state  (q) and the benefits they  on  average 
receive (8). 
In this formulation, the true determinants of  I are viewed as having 
their impact through q  and 8, two instruments which can be thought of as 
the extensive margin of  transfer  recipiency and the intensive margin, 
respectively. If  q and 8 are assumed to be the outcome of  an implicit 
market  for transfers,  the Z  vector  must  include state characteristics 
reflecting both  the demand  for  transfers  (e.g.,  the incidence in  the 
population of groups likely to be eligible for transfers) and the supply of 
transfers (e.g., tastes of  the population for poverty reduction). 
If, in fact, the impact of  transfers on inequality in the state is the 
outcome of  this market process, the determinants of  I could be under- 
stood by simply regressing I on 2. 
(5)  I=  n’z  +  €4. 
In what follows, results from both models are shown. In the first, the 
exogenous Z variables are viewed as having their impact on I through q 
and 8; in the second, these factors are viewed as direct determinants of I. 
The estimates shown are for 1975 and rely on state data taken from the 
Survey of  Income and Education. The vector of  Z  variables is: 
1. the state unemployment rate (UR), 
2.  the percent of the state’s household heads that is female (FEHD), 
3. the percent of  the state’s population that is over 65 (AGED), 
4. the average family size of  the state’s households (FSIZ). 
Because  transfer  programs  are targeted  on the aged  and families 
headed by a female, FEHD and AGED are demand-side variables. The 
family-size-conditioned nature of  many transfers causes FSIZ to reflect 
the demand for transfers as well.  UR captures both the demand for 307  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
transfers by those who are unemployed and covered by unemployment 
insurance and, insofar as it reflects the performance of a state’s economy, 
the ability of  the state to supply transfers? 
Consider first the framework in which the exogenous determinants of Z 
are viewed as working through q and 8. The first three columns of table 
8.13 present the regression results for this model. All of the exogenous 
variables have the expected sign in explaining the variance in both ?-the 
extent of  transfer recipiency-and  &the  “depth” of  transfer support. 
And all of  them are significant. The AGED variable has the largest 
impact on both q and 8. A one percentage point increase in AGED 
increases both the percent of the population who are recipients and the 
percent of the income of  recipients accounted for by  transfers by more 
than one percentage point. While the unemployment rate (UR) has an 
important impact on the percent of the population receiving  transfers (q), 
its effect on the relative level of  transfers received by recipients (8) is 
significant  but small. The small effect on 8 presumably reflects the role of 
UR in capturing both demand- and supply-side effects. 
The third column shows that both q  and 8 are very significant determi- 
nants of  Z-the  impact of transfers on inequality. Their relative magni- 
tudes suggest that the role of transfers in reducing inequality works more 
strongly through the level of  transfers received by  recipients (8) than 
through the number of  households receiving transfers (q). This is as we 
would expect. Given the pro-poor character of transfers, a larger impact 
on inequality is expected from targeting an increment of  transfers on 
existing recipients than from extending the number of recipients. In terms 
Table 8.13  The Determinants of q,  8, and I, 1975 (t-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variables 
Independent  - 
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of  inequality reduction, the intensive margin is more important than is 
the extensive margin. 
The direct effect of the exogenous variables on the impact of transfers 
on inequality (I)  is shown in the fourth column of  table 8.13. All of  the 
variables have the expected sign, and all are significant.  As expected, the 
proportion  of  the population  older than 65 (AGED) is the most sig- 
nificant variable in explaining the impact of transfers on inequality. The 
arc elasticities for the independent variables are: 
UR  +.08 
FEHD + .10 
AGED + .29 
FSIZ  +.07 
Hence, a 1  percent increase in the share of the aged population increases 
the impact of transfers on inequality by  .3 percent; relative increases in 
the other variables have a substantially smaller effect on the inequality 
reducing impact of  transfers.  While transfers, then, reduce inequality 
within  all regions  and  states, their  impact  is  greater the higher  the 
unemployment rate of the region, the larger the average family size in the 
region, the higher the proportion of female-headed families in the region, 
and, especially, the larger the aged proportion of the region’s  population. 
8.7  Summary and Conclusions 
As is well known, income transfers are targeted on the low-income 
population and, hence, are equalizing. Moreover, the larger the transfers 
relative to nontransfer income are, ceteris paribus, the greater is the 
reduction in inequality for which they are responsible. Numerous studies 
have documented the impact of  transfers in reducing poverty, reducing 
inequality in the size distribution of income, reducing inequality between 
groups  (e.g., blacks  and whites,  elderly  and  nonelderly,  intact  and 
female-headed families), and reducing the inequality within particular 
groups, such as the elderly, blacks, and the disabled. 
This study is in that tradition. We have focused on groups of individuals 
identified by their region of  residence, sometimes by states and some- 
times by regional groupings of states. A number of questions have been 
posed regarding the level and the dispersion of  the incomes of  these 
regional groupings of individuals-both  across the groups and within the 
groups; both at a point in time and across time. 
The questions posed and the results obtained are as follows: 
1. How different are the states in terms of  per household income? 
In  1975 the gap between  the states was substantial-in  terms of 
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state is 2.4. The ratio falls to 1.8  when post-transfer, post-tax income 
(Y,) is used. 
2.  Does the inequality in average income among the states contribute 
Using the Theil index, the differences in average income among the 
states accounts for only about 2 percent of  the total level of  national 
income inequality. Inequality among people within states accounts for 
the rest. 
3, How different are the states in the extent of inequality among their 
In terms of Y,, the ratio of the Theil index of the most unequal to the 
least unequal state is 2.2. The ratio falls to 1.4  when Y4  is used. In sum, 
substantial disparity exists among states in the extent of  within-state 
inequality, but the disparity is far less for post-transfer income than for 
pretransfer income. 
4.  Which states are the most unequal in the distribution of  income 
The distribution  of income is  most  unequal within the southern 
states; the northcentral and northeastern states have the least inequal- 
ity. This is true irrespective of  the income concept used. 
5.  At a point in time, have transfers contributed substantially to a 
In 1975 the dispersion of average post-transfer income (Y3)  among 
states (as measured by  the Theil index) was 23 percent less than the 
dispersion  of  average  pre-transfer  income  (Y,)  . Transfer  income 
accounts for this reduction. 
6. At a point in time, have transfers contributed substantially to a 
Again  using the Theil index, transfers  caused a very substantial 
decline of  70 percent in average inequality within the states in 1975. 
7.  To  what extent have transfers caused states to converge over time in 
Consider the period from 1967 to 1979. Using an index of  state 
differences which combine both average income differences and ine- 
quality differences, transfers caused an overall reduction in the index 
from .042 to .013, a reduction of  68 percent. Of  this .029 reduction, 
about 90 percent was from a reduction of  differences among states in 
inequality; about 10 percent was from a reduction in state average 
income differences. 
8. To what extent has income inequality within regions changed over 
Using market income (Yl),  average inequality within states increased 
from  1967 to 1979. The Theil index of  within-region inequality in- 
creased from .96 to 1.02. For fourteen of  twenty regions, the Theil 
index for Yl increased from 1967 to 1979. For post-transfer income, 
very much to the aggregate level of  inequality in the nation? 
citizens? 
among their citizens; which are the least unequal? 
reduction in average income differences among states? 
reduction in inequality within states? 
both income levels and income inequality? 
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within-region inequality stayed at about  .34. Eleven of  the twenty 
regions showed a decrease. 
9. Has the inequality in average incomes across regions declined over 
The Theil measure for Y, shows a decline of  46 percent from 1967 to 
1979; that for Y3 shows about a 50 percent reduction. Differences in 
average incomes among states have declined enormously from 1967 to 
1979, irrespective of  the income concept. 
10. What role have transfers played in decreasing overall inequality 
From 1967 to 1979 Theil inequality among all households increased 
from ,97 to 1.02, using Y,.  For Y3,  the Theil index stayed constant at 
about  .35. The effect of  transfers  has been  to offset the growing 
inequality in market incomes over time. In the late 1960s, transfers 
reduced inequality by  about 63 percent; this increased to about 68 
percent in the late 1970s. 
11.  Regions have converged over time in both average incomes and 
inequality. What role has the transfer system played in this convergence? 
Using our index of state differences, transfers increased their impact 
in reducing the index of overall state differences (RV,)  from 33 percent 
in 1967 to 61 percent in 1979. The contribution of transfers in reducing 
income inequalities within states (RV,,)  increased from 48 to 74 per- 
cent over the same period. The impact of  transfers in reducing state 
income differences (RVf)  was small, but  increased from 11 to 20 
percent. In sum, transfers contributed substantially and increasingly to 
decreases in overall income inequality and inequality within regions. 
The contribution of  transfers to observed  convergence in  average 
incomes among regions was small over the entire period, but increased 
slightly. The bulk of the convergence in average incomes among states 
was the result of more rapid growth in Yl in the poorer southern regions 
over this period. 
12. For which regions did transfers increase their impact in reducing 
inequality over time? 
The South and the Northeast experienced a growing impact of trans- 
fers in reducing inequality, relative to the remaining regions. 
13. Has the impact of  transfers in decreasing the differences among 
regions in within-region income inequality increased or decreased? 
From 1967 to 1979 states became more divergent in the inequality in 
the distribution of market income (YJ,  but converged in the inequality 
of  post-transfer income (Y3).  The impact of  transfers in reversing the 
divergence in market income inequality can be described in several 
ways: 
time? 
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-In  1967 transfers  reduced  the range among regions in within- 
region inequality by  13 percent; in 1979, by 54 percent. 
-In  1967 transfers reduced the relative variance among regions in 
within-region inequality by  48 percent; in 1979, by 74 percent. 
14. At any point in time, transfers contribute to a reduction in inequal- 
ity within all states and regions. What characteristics cause the impact of 
transfers on inequality to be greater in some states than in others? 
At the margin, the impact of transfers on inequality is greater if  the 
increment is used to increase the benefits of existing recipients, rather 
than enlarging the number of recipients. The marginal impact of trans- 
fers on inequality reduction is larger in states with higher unemploy- 
ment rates, larger average family sizes, a higher proportion of female- 
headed families, and especially, a higher proportion of  aged persons. 
The equalizing role of  transfers in the economy can be clearly seen in 
this region-based analysis, both at a point in time and over time. At a 
point in time (1975), transfers (1) reduce average income differences 
among states by about 13 percent, (2) reduce inequality within states by 
about 32 percent, and (3) reduce differences in within-state inequality 
among states by about 60 percent. Over time, the transfer system has 
grown rapidly, both as a share of total income and in terms of the number 
of households who are recipients. As a result, from 1967 to 1979 transfers 
(1) reversed the trend toward overall inequality in market incomes, (2) 
increased their contribution to the reduction in overall inequality from 64 
percent to 68 percent, (3) increased their contribution to reducing in- 
equalities within states from 48 to 74 percent, (4) increased from 11 to 18 
percent their contribution to the reduction in average income differences 
among states, (5)  increased from 42 to 75 percent their contribution to the 
convergence in within-state income inequalities among regions, and (6) 
increased their contribution to reducing the overall index of state income 
differences from 33 to 61 percent. 
A more vivid and broadbrush picture of the regional impact of  trans- 
fers can be seen by focusing only on the income and inequality differences 
between the South and the North over time. The pattern of  differences 
between these two regions and changes in these differences reflect the 
general national pattern, and clearly portrays the role of  income trans- 
fers. 
Across the entire period from 1965 to 1979, the South had both a lower 
average income and greater inequality in the distribution of income than 
did the North. Over that period, however, the South-North disparity in 
both average income and inequality was reduced. The convergence in 
average incomes was primarily caused by a more rapid increase in market 
incomes in the South than in the North over this period. The source of the 312  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
convergence was economic growth; income transfers had little to do with 
it. Indeed, while ratio of income transfers to market income was greater 
in the South than in the North over the entire period, the increase in this 
ratio in the northeast and northcentral states exceeded that in the South 
and the West over the period. 
At the beginning of  the period, market incomes in the South were 
distributed substantially more unequally than in the North. While market 
income inequality increased in both regions over the period, the trend 
toward more inequality was greater in the North than in  the South. 
However, in both regions the distribution of  census money income be- 
came slightly more equal from 1965 to 1979 and, indeed, the regions 
became more alike in their final income distributions. Both the reduction 
in census money income inequality and the convergence of  the regions 
over the period are attributable primarily to the growth in and allocation 
of  income transfers. 
These transfer income patterns, while complex, do have policy implica- 
tions. Here we will mention only the most prominent of them and do so in 
the form of  questions: 
1. If  a continued downward trend in the degree of  inequality among 
regions, or continued reductions in inequality within regions, is valued by 
society, what is the likely impact of reduced transfers on these indicators 
of  economic performance? Will cuts in transfers promote increased in- 
equality within regions and increase disparity in inequality among re- 
gions, or will the policy changes maintain the reductions in inequality in 
both dimensions that have already been achieved? 
2.  The growth in transfers over the past fifteen years has been dom- 
inated by the federal transfer system. What will be the effect of transfer- 
ring discretion  over the level and composition of  transfers  from the 
federal to state governments? Will the loss of  federally mandated pro- 
grams and benefit minima seriously erode the contribution of transfers to 
reducing within-region and total inequality, and to reducing the disparity 
among regions in within-region inequality. 
3. To what extent will the renewed emphasis on economic growth 
continue to yield reductions in the inequality of  average incomes among 
regions? Or will future economic growth reverse the pattern of  impacts 
experienced over the last fifteen years? 
4. Are policies other than income transfers available to mitigate or 
reverse the trend toward  increased  market  income inequality within 
regions (and within the nation)? Is the future sectoral composition of 
growth, with its emphasis on high-technology, skill-intensive activities, 
likely to exacerbate this problem of  growing market income inequality? 
And, if so, does this not call for continued emphasis on income transfers if 
the overall small reductions in final income inequality are to be main- 
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Finally, we would emphasize the tentative nature of our results. They 
clearly raise as many research questions as they answer. Our effort has 
largely been one of measurement and documentation; the causes of  the 
changes we have uncovered here have only been briefly explored. While 
we have made a first effort to determine which regional characteristics 
have accounted for the within-region reductions in inequality attributable 
to transfers, the analysis neglected a number of  higher moments of  the 
Theil measure which could have played a role. Moreover, the determi- 
nants that we did identify are primarily permanent regional characteris- 
tics which have little to do with transfer policy measures that could be 
used to influence the inequality reduction potential of  transfers. 
A few extensions of  this research are immediately obvious. First, our 
determinants analysis is based on cross-section state data for a single 
year, 1975. This analysis could be extended by enlarging the data base to 
the twelve years of available Current Population Survey tapes, though at 
the cost of  regional detail in  any year from 50 to 20. The variation 
introduced by the time series data could enable more precise identifica- 
tion of both the regional characteristics and policy variables affecting the 
distributional effects of  transfers. Second, we have considered only a 
subset of  the full range of  transfers affecting regional incomes and the 
inequality of their distributions; in-kind transfers, additional cash trans- 
fers, and fringe benefits could be merged onto the data tapes, and the 
impacts of  this more full-blown definition of  transfers on regional in- 
comes  and  inequalities  could be  analyzed.  Finally, our  analysis has 
looked only at first-round regional and distributional impacts of transfers 
and taxes. These policies generate both consumption reallocations and 
labor supply effects which, in a general equilibrium context, work their 
way through the economy, changing prices, outputs, and wages differen- 
tially by  regions. Analytic models exist for exploring the regional and 
distributional  implications of  these second-, third-, and fourth-round 
effects of  transfers (see Golladay and Haveman  1977). For simulated 
transfer policy changes less extensive than the transfers analyzed here, 
the full pattern of  regional and distributional impacts have been found to 
vary substantially from the first-round effects. 
Appendix A  Data Bases Used in Study: 
CPS and SIE 
Two separate data bases have been employed in this study. The major 
data source is the Survey of  Income and Education (SIE) conducted in 
1976. It contains demographic and economic information for roughly 
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data base was chosen as the primary data base for the sole reason that it is 
the most recent public-use data source that is statistically large enough to 
allow analysis to be performed on the state leve1.6 While the SIE does 
allow state-by-state analysis, it unfortunately provides but one point in 
time to view the regional dispersions in incomes. Thus, to see if  the 
patterns observed in the SIE data for 1975 persist over time, we  also 
employed a series of  Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1968 to 
1980. This series of  microdata  bases allows us  to track  the regional 
dispersion of  incomes for  twenty  regions  (clusters of  states) for the 
calendar years 1967 through 1979. 
In this study we employed four different income concepts: market 
income (Yl),  market income plus social insurance benefits (Y2),  post- 
transfer income (  Y,), and post-tax and post-transfer income (Y,).  A more 
precise definition of each of  these concepts is given in table 8.A.1.  One 
should note that some difference does exist between the SIE and CPS 
Table 8.A.1  Definitions of Income Concepts Used in Study 
SIE  CPS 
Market Income (Y,) = 
Wages and salaries +  X  X 
Self-employment income  +  X  X 
Interest, dividends, and rental income  +  X  X 
Private employment retirement benefits  +  X  X 
Public employee retirement benefits  + 
Alimony, child support and other  X  X 
y* +  X  X 
Social Security and railroad retirement  +  X  X 
Worker’s compensation  +  X  X 
Veterans’ benefits  +  X  X 
Unemployment compensation  +  X  X 
Public employee retirement benefits  X 
y2  +  X  X 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children  +  X  X 
Supplemental Security Income (OAA) +  X  X 
General assistance  +  X  X 
Food Stamps +  X 
Earned income tax credit  X 
y3  - 
Federal income tax -  X 
FICA payroll tax -  X 
State income tax  X 
X 
Market Income Plus Social Insurance (  Yz) = 
Post-Transfer Income (Y3) 
Post-Tax, Post-Transfer Income (Y,) = 
“X” indicates that the income source was included in the income concept and data base. 315  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
Table 8.A.2  Control Totals for Y,  (billions of  dollars) 
Conti01  Value on  %Captured 



























































SOURCES  FOR Y, TOTALS: For 1970, 1972-79:  Statistical Abstract 1980, p. 445, table 738. Y, 
control total = personal income -  transfer payments + personal contributions for social 
insurance - other labor income. For 1968, 1969, 1971: Statistical Abstract 1973, p. 324, 
table 526. For 1967: Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 316, table 480. 
’Public employee retirement included. 
definitions, primarily with respect to public employee retirement ben- 
efits. In the SIE, we treated public employee benefits as private retire- 
ment benefits and included them in market income. However, the CPS 
data base did not allow us to separate public employee retirement ben- 
efits from other insurance programs; hence, they were included in the Y2 
measure of  income on the CPS data base. 
Tables 8.A.2  through 8.A.4  present  control totals from other pub- 
lished sources and the amounts that we “capture” on the individual data 
bases for the three major sources of  income. Table 8.A.2  provides this 
information on market income (Yl),  while tables 8.A.3  and 8.A.4  provide 
the same information for the two additions to Yl that comprise post- 
transfer income: namely, social insurance and cash welfare benefits. As 
one can see from the tables, the SIE provides the best “capture rate” on 
all three sources of income, which also suggests its use as a primary data 
source. 316  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
Table 8.A.3  Control Total for Social Insurance (billions of dollars) 
Control  Value on  % Captured 



























































SOURCES  FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE  TOTALS: For 1970,1975,1977-78: Statistical Abstractl980,  p. 
336, table 539. For 1976: Statistical Abstract 1979, p. 332, table 530. For 1974: Statistical 
Abstractl977, p. 324, table 507. For 1971-73:  StatisticalAbstractl975, p. 285, table 453. For 
1968-69: Statistical Abstract 1971, p, 275, table 435. For 1967: Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 
280, table 420. 
"Public employee retirement included. 
Table 8.A.4  Control Totals for Cash Welfare (billions of dollars) 
Control  Value on  % Captured 






























3.641  66.8 
4.388  69.6 
4.841  64.0 
6.115  66.3 
6.996  59.3 
7.643  54.0 
8.033  54.1 
10.097  62.0 
11.365  57.2 
12.454  58.2 
13.303  57.0 
13.530  56.2 
14.237  - 
SIE tapea 
21.824  88.9 
SOURCES  FOR CASH WELFARE TOTALS: For 1970,1973-78: StatisticalAbstractl980, pp. 332-33, 
table 534. Control totals calculated by subtracting Medicaid, Food Stamps (except SIE), 
and other from public aid total. For 1972: Statistical Abstract 1975, p. 281, table 447. For 
1971: Statistical Abstract 1973, p. 287, table 461. For 1967-69: Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 
277, table 416. 
"Includes Food Stamps. 317  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
Appendix B  The Theil Index of Income 
Inequality 
Decomposition of  the Theil Index by States 
H. Theil(l967) proposed a measure of inequality containing a number 
of  desirable properties and based on information theory. One of  these 
properties was that the overall index could be easily decomposed into a 
measure of  the extent of  inequality between and within some specified 
groupings of the observations. The groupings used in this study were the 
states or regions in which households resided. 




T = C -h (F/K), 
where N  = the number of  households, yi = the ith household income, 
and 
Assume now that the population has been allocated according to the 
location of their residence, that is, their state (or region). Theil has shown 
that the aggregate index TT can be decomposed as: 
= the mean income in the population. 
(Al)  Ti-= TA + Tw, 
where 
and M  = the number of states, Nj = the number of households in the jth 
state,q  = N,/N,  Sj = the set of individuals who reside in thejth state, 
and 
Upon examination, TA is the Theil inequality index of the states’ mean 
level of  incomes while Tw is the weighted average of  within levels of 
income inequality for the M states. Thus the overall Theil index (TT)  can 
be decomposed into two separate components: the inequality between 
states (measured by  their mean incomes),  and the weighted average 
across the states of  the individual inequality within states. 
A Decomposition of  the Impact of  Transfers 
on the Theil Index of  Inequality 
In this paper, we measured the impact of  transfers as the difference 
between census money income (Y3)  and market income (Y,). Thus to 
describe the role of transfers in reducing overall inequality and inequality 
between and within states, we only have to consider the effect of changing 
= mean household injth state. 318  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
the income concept on equation (Al).  We can decompose the effect of 
transfers in reducing overall inequality into two effects: the change in 
inequality  in  average  income among states (change in  TA),  and the 
change in the weighted average across states of  the within-state level of 
inequality (change in Tw). That is: 
TT1 -  T73  = (TAI -  TA3)  + (TWl -  TW3)  9 
=  ATA  +  ATw 
where the second subscript refers to the income concept employed. The 
first term in this decomposition measures the extent to which overall 
inequality is  reduced  because of  the reduced variation in state mean 
income attributable to transfers; the second term measures the extent to 
which the weighted average across states of  within-state inequality is 
reduced by transfers. The second term can be rewritten as: 
AT,=  ?qj(Tlj-T3j)7 
I 
where 
Tki = the Theil inequality index for jth state defined for 
the kth income concept. 
Thus ATw is the weighted average of  the change in each state’s own 
index of  inequality using the state’s share of  the population as weights. 
The decomposition of the impact of transfers on any individual state’s 
inequality  index requires some explanation.  In  order  not  to further 
complicate the notation, we will drop the subscript referring to the state, 
although it should be understood that the impact of  transfers on inequal- 
ity within a state is being decomposed. 
To decompose the impact of  transfers within a state, first divide the 
state’s population into two groups: those households that receive trans- 
fers (id,)  and those which do not  (i#SR).  Using the decomposition 
procedure described above, but employing recipiency of transfers as the 
grouping classification,  the Theil index for income concepts Yl  and Y3 can 
be decomposed as follows: 
-- 
Tk = [ln(Yk/YkNR)  + ln(Fk/FkR)]  + [qR  C  1n(FkR/Yki) 
idR 
for k = 1 and 3 where Fk = mean state income fork  income concept, FkR 
= mean recipient income for k income concept, rkNR  = mean nonrecip- 
ient income for k income concept, R = number of households receiving 
transfers, and qR = R/N = the percent of  the population  receiving 
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Using this decomposition, we can interpret the first bracketed expres- 
sion as an index of the difference in average income between the nonre- 
cipient and recipient populations using the kth income concept (denoted 
as TkG).  The second bracketed expression is the weighted average of the 
inequality within the two groups (denoted as TkD).  Hence, the reduction 
in inequality resulting from transfers (I)  can be written as 
Z = Ti -  T3 = (TIC -  T3G) + (TiD -  T3D) = AT,  + ATD  . 
Now note that since Yl  equals Y3 when i#SR,  ATD can be written as 
1 
idR  R 
ATD = -qR 2 -  [tn(FIR/Yli) -  tn(?3R/Y3i)] 
where  Oi  = the share of  the household's  income which  comes from 
transfers equal to 
Y3i -  Yii -  TRi  -- 
Y3i  y3i  ' 
TRi = the household's transfers, 6 = the mean 0 in the recipient popula- 
tion, and 
which is the Theil index of inequality of  the relative share of  market 
income in the recipient population. 
Thus the total impact of transfers on within-state inequality can be 
decomposed as 
I=  AT,  + qRD,, 
where 
which is an index of  the dispersion of  8 in the recipient population. 
This decomposition  can be given the following interpretation.  The 
term ATG can be interpreted as a measure of the degree to which the gap 
in incomes between  the recipients  and  nonrecipients  is reduced,  on 
average. Thus, if  transfers raise the incomes of  recipients relative to 
nonrecipients, AT,  must be positive. 
The second term, D,,  requires some explanation. Consider the situa- 
tion where every recipient receives a transfer such that Bi  = 6,  or equal to 
TRi = YliG/(l -  G), 320  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
In this case, it can easily be demonstrated that D,  is equal to  zero. Hence, 
D,  can be interpreted as the impact on total inequality of the divergence 
of  actual transfers from the zero variance standard. The sign of  D, is 
difficult to assign. The second term To,  since it is a Theil index, will always 
be positive. However, using Jensen’s inequality, the first term of  D,  is 
seen to be positive only if, within the recipient population, transfers are 
not strongly positively correlated with pretransfer income. 
One final decomposition of  the impact of  transfers can be noted: 
whereOSXS1. 
j=  1 
Since Oi  will by  definition always be between zero and one j 
The fourth-order approximation of  T,  hence can be written as 
where u$  = variance of 8,  s(8)  = skewness of 8, and k(8)  = kurtosis of 8. 
(Note: A fourth-order approximation will be needed if  6 lies between .3 
and .6 and higher-order terms will be needed if  8 lies above .6). 
Hence T,  can be interpreted as the index of  the distribution of  the 
relative importance of transfers in the recipient population. From empir- 
ical experience, 6 is the dominant moment in this decomposition, hence, 
given that s(8) is sufficiently nonnegative, T,  will be positively related to 
the average “dependency” of  the recipient population on transfers (6). 
Notes 
1. Our brief attention to this question here is a result of the helpful conference comments 
of  Peter Gottschalk. 
2.  See appendix  A  for a detailed  description of  the  definitions  of  the  four income 
concepts and the data bases from which these numbers were computed. 
3.  Throughout this paper we have assumed that comparisons made between Y, and Y3 
are the appropriate comparisons to be made to assess the impact of transfers. However, we 
should note that the existence of  transfer affects, through labor supply savings and con- 
sumption behavior, not only the level but also the distribution of  market incomes. Thus the 
approximate basis of  comparison would be the distribution of  market incomes that exist in 
the absence of transfers. Work by Betson, Greenberg, and Kasten (1980) and Golladay and 
Haveman (1977) suggest that the use of Y,  as a basis of  comparison might tend to overstate 
the redistributive impact of  transfers. 321  Role of  Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
4. To derive this measure of  overall convergence, let us first “standardize”  the two 
dimensions of comparison as 
= relative richness of  the Sth state; 
T, -  TW 
TW 
Rel,,  = - 
= relative inequality of  the Sth state, 
where Fs  = mean income of the Sth state; Ts  = within-state Theil inequality index of  the Sth 
state; FT = ZqsFs = average state mean income; Tw = ZqsTs; and qs  = population share 
of the Sth state. 
The summary measure of  overall convergence can then be defined as: 
where 
=the relative variance of the state’s mean income; 
= relative variance of  within-state inequality. 
One should note that RVp and TA are both measures of  the relative dispersion in mean state 
incomes. However, RVIN  and Tw are measuring quite different concepts. While RVIN  is a 
measure of  the relative variance of within-state inequality (Ts),  Tw measures the average 
within-state level of  inequality. 
5. A variety of  other variables exists with some claim to reflecting supply- or demand- 
side influences on the volume of  income transfers within a state, including race, health 
status, education, and relative income. Strong intercorrelations among these and between 
them and the included variables  led  to their  exclusion from the final regression.  The 
variables included reflect population characteristics that directly determine transfer eligibil- 
ity and benefit awards. 
6.  The 1980 public-use census tapes which would be statistically large enough to perform 
state-by-state analysis are not yet available. 
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Comment  Peter Gottschalk 
The authors start from two well-known observations. First, there has 
been a convergence of mean incomes between states over the last decade. 
Second, transfer payments have increased substantially over the same 
period. This rise in transfers has served to offset the increasing inequality 
of  market  incomes leading to a fairly stable degree of  inequality of 
post-transfer income. The authors ask whether the increased transfers 
explains not only the stability in the personal income distribution but also 
the convergence of  average incomes across states. 
Since the authors summarize their conclusions clearly, I will not repeat 
all their conclusions here.  However,  in  case the  massive amount  of 
documentation hides what I consider to be the most interesting conclu- 
sion, let me stress it. Less than 2 percent of  the overall inequality in 
market-generated income (or in  any of  their post-tax or post-transfer 
income concepts) is caused by inequality among states. This implies that 
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even if  we were to institute a fully effective regional policy, which would 
totally equalize average incomes among states, this would have a negligi- 
ble impact  on overall inequality unless it also decreased within-state 
inequality.  This is a striking conclusion of  crucial importance in the 
debate about whether regional policy  should be  designed to achieve 
distributional goals. 
My comments are divided into two parts. First, I review some of the 
specific measures used by the authors and suggest some changes. Second, 
I ask why one would be interested in decomposing changes in inequality 
into changes attributable to within-state differences and changes attribut- 
able to among-state differences. 
Methodological Issues 
I would like to raise two issues about the methodology used by the 
authors. The first focuses on the use of  relative variances to describe 
convergence among states. The second focuses on the regressions used to 
determine the effectiveness of  transfers in reducing inequality. 
Index of  regional inequality. In describing the convergence among states, 
the authors define an index which is equal to the sum of the variance of 
the states’ relative  incomes plus the variance of  their  relative  Theil 
indexes. I consider each in turn. 
The variance of  relative mean income is simply an alternative to the 
among-state Theil index used in the rest of the paper. Since these concep- 
tually measure very much the same thing, all conclusions are basically the 
same using either index of inequality. 
The variance of  the relative Theil indexes, however, does add a new 
dimension.  The inclusion of  transfers  may  make  the distribution  of 
post-transfer income more similar across states, not only by  bringing 
mean incomes closer together but also by  making the spread of  these 
distributions more alike. The latter element is captured by the variance of 
the relative Theil indexes. Inasmuch as policymakers value having the 
same degree of inequality in all states, this attribute will enter their social 
welfare function. 
To summarize the two elements of  convergence (similar means and 
inequality), the authors compute the sum of these two relative variances. 
This part of the paper would have benefited from an explicit discussion of 
the normative basis for this particular summary measure. By taking the 
sum of  two indexes, the authors implicitly assume that both dimensions 
have equal weight in the social welfare function. My  guess is that the 
actions of  policymakers would reveal a much higher value placed on 
equalizing incomes among states than  on equalizing inequality.  This 
implies that a composite index would place a higher weight on reducing 
the relative variance of  means. 324  David BetsodRobert Haveman 
Determinants of  regional inequality. The second methodological issue I 
would like to explore is the authors’ explanation of  factors that cause 
transfers to be more or less effective in reducing pretransfer inequality. 
The decomposition of the difference between the pre- and post-transfer 
Theil indexes in the appendix is a useful contribution. The authors show 
that when  inequality is measured by  the Theil index, the impact of 
transfers in reducing inequality depends on three factors: (1) the portion 
of the population receiving transfers; (2) the reduction in the income gap 
between  recipients  and nonrecipients, and  (3) the dispersion of  the 
distribution of  the percentage of  income that comes from transfers. 
It is interesting to compare this decomposition with the decomposition 
of  income sources, using the variance of log income as the measure of 
inequality.  Using the authors’ notation,  and letting R  be the ratio of 
post-transfer to  pretransfer income, it can be shown easily that the impact 
of  transfers in reducing the log variance is equal to 
var(y3) -  var(yl) = var(r) -  2 cov(ryl), 
where lower-case letters represent logarithms. The reduction in inequal- 
ity from including transfers, therefore, depends on the amount of varia- 
tion in the size of the transfers (as represented in the variance of  r)  and 
whether transfers are correlated with pretransfer income (as captured by 
the covariance). While I prefer the simplicity of the log variance measure, 
the authors have provided a useful service by showing us the counterpart 
using the Theil measure. 
Their empirical work, however, is not closely linked to their theoretical 
appendix. The authors posit a linear approximation to the relationship 
between the reduction in inequality caused by transfers and two factors: 
the proportion of the population receiving transfers (q)  and the average 
ratio of  transfers to total income for recipients in the state (0). Their 
appendix, however, shows that the reduction in inequality depends not 
only on the state means but also on higher-level moments. 
This makes intuitive sense. Suppose a state had a larger proportion of 
people receiving transfers or that the average ratio of transfers to income 
was higher in the state. How much would this decrease inequality? The 
answer depends on the extent to which transfers go to people in the lower 
tail of  the distribution. Using log variance to decompose makes this 
obvious, since there is a covariance term in the expression. 
The paper would have been improved by calculating these upper-level 
moments. The authors could then have regressed all these components of 
Z (the impact of transfers) on state characteristics. The total impact of the 
state characteristics could then have been calculated using the accounting 
framework developed in the appendix. 
The regression results could also have been made more useful if the 
authors had included some instruments to reflect the endogenous, policy- 325  Role of Income Transfers in Reducing Inequality 
relevant variables which affect the effectiveness of transfers in reducing 
inequality. These would show what legislative changes could be made to 
improve the effectiveness of transfers. While states can do relatively little 
to change the age composition of  their  population, they can change 
benefit levels or expand AFDC to include families with an unemployed 
parent. Without such policy handles, the equations remain merely de- 
scriptive devices that do not suggest ways states can change their own 
destinies. 
Normative Issues 
The authors’ are right  in  claiming that  since policymakers are in- 
terested in regional distribution issues, for whatever reason, this is suf- 
ficient ground for being interested in the authors’ study. However, it may 
be useful to further explore the underlying rationale to identify possible 
conflicts between the goal of  regional equality and other goals. I will 
devote the rest of  my  comments to this issue. 
As the authors point out, there is a long tradition of  subdividing the 
population into groups and looking at the within- and between-group 
inequality. Notably, people have looked at the inequality between the 
races, among experience groups, and between sexes. The question is why 
one is interested in any specific grouping of  the population. It is only a 
mechanical matter to calculate these between-group  inequality mea- 
sures. The question I  am raising is whether grouping the population 
according to the state they live in has a clear normative basis. 
We need to determine some normative reason for focusing on place of 
residence as a grouping variable. Any decomposition into between and 
among inequality implies that we care not only about the total inequality 
but also about the relative importance of the between and within inequal- 
ity. To  focus attention on this element, I propose that we think in terms of 
changes in the economy that would keep total inequality constant but 
change the mix of between and within inequality. Does the relative size of 
these two components of  total inequality have any normative implica- 
tion? 
First, we may inherently be concerned about some types of  between- 
group inequality. This is clearly the case when we think of  black-white 
inequality. Equal average incomes across races might be a legitimate goal 
in itself. If  we are forced to hold inequality constant, we would prefer to 
see a larger percentage of the inequality attributed to within-race inequal- 
ity rather than between-race inequality. In this case we may be intrinsi- 
cally interested in the size of  the between-group inequality. Does this 
hold for states? 
Do we feel better knowing that states are totally equal and that all 
inequality comes from differences in incomes within states? My answer to 
this question depends crucially on the amount of  interstate mobility. If 326  David Betson/Robert Haveman 
people are born into a state and can never leave that state, then any 
increase in  among-state inequality decreases the expected income of 
some people  who  are tied  to a particular  locale.  In this sense it  is 
equivalent to being black. It may, therefore, be of  interest in its own 
right. On the other hand, if people are mobile, there may be little intrinsic 
reason to care whether inequality comes from differences among states or 
within states. Another way of stating this is that we may not be willing to 
accept greater total inequality in order to change the relative importance 
of  among-state inequality. 
A second reason we might be interested in this question focuses on 
within-state inequality. Suppose deprivation is relative. If  persons living 
in poor states view their condition in relationship to other people in the 
same state, then we should applaud any decrease in the relative impor- 
tance of  within-state inequality. An increase in among-state inequality 
matched by offsetting reductions in within-state inequality may increase 
social welfare. Again, we are interested in the decomposition of inequal- 
ity, but in this case we would like to see the relative size of  the within 
inequality diminished. 
While certain circumstances may arise where the relative size of these 
two components of  inequality may  enter the social welfare function, 
many popular arguments seem to view regional equalization only as a 
means to achieving the goal of reducing poverty or total inequality. In this 
light the authors’ paper is extremely useful, for it shows that if regional 
development increases the mean income of poor states, but does nothing 
to the within-state inequality, it will have little impact on total equality. 
Only programs targeted at decreasing within-state inequality are likely to 
have a large impact. The question one would then want to raise is why 
these  should  be  regional  programs?  Why  should  programs  not  be 
targeted at the poor directly if  a reduction in their numbers is the goal? 
Summary 
The authors have presented a massive body of  evidence which takes a 
good deal of time to digest. For anyone seriously  interested in within- and 
among-state inequality, the authors have provided a gold mine. It seems 
difficult to imagine many additional numbers that anyone would still want 
to be calculated. The strength of the paper lies in its processing a huge 
amount of information and clearly presenting the results. What remains 
to be done by those in this field is to develop the normative foundations 
and the theoretical links between policy instruments and increases in this 
dimension of  social welfare. 